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ANTICOMPETITIVE
REGULATION IN THE
PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY
Ronald Mann*

ABSTRACT
The payment card industry in the United States has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. The Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 reflects a high-water mark of congressional influence
for the industry, altering bankruptcy procedures largely for the benefit of card issuers. Since that point, Congress
has turned repeatedly to rein in perceived abuses in the industry. The most substantial and direct response to the
perception of abuse is the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009. That statute was
focused directly on the card industry and outlawed a wide variety of industry practices. More recently, in § 1075 (the
“Durbin Amendment”) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress cut permissible
interchange fees for debit card transactions to amounts that approximate the costs of processing those transactions;
the Federal Reserve’s implementing regulation apparently will lead to a more than 50 percent decline in those fees.
So why is it at all noteworthy that Congress, in the course of reining in an industry targeted for excessive behavior,
should require substantial changes in the industry’s operations? My hypothesis is a simple one. Both provisions make
it more challenging to operate profitably in the payment card market. Because both provisions will pose greater
challenges for smaller firms than they do for larger firms, both statutes will make it harder for smaller banks to
compete in the payment card market. It may not be easy to evaluate the consequences of greater concentration in
the industry. But it is clear that industry concentration is not what drove Congress to action: whatever else Congress
was trying to do, it certainly was not trying to drive small banks from the payment card market

*
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I. THE CCA AND THE
CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY

Essentially, the goal of credit card issuers in those
early days was to maximize the share of revolvers
and minimize the share of transactors, while keeping
chargeoffs at a relatively low level by excluding the risky.
Even at that level of simplicity, the product was a risky
one, as many issuers lost money, largely because of
rampant fraud on the part of cardholders.5 But during
the intervening years, the market has changed in several
important ways, primarily because

A) INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CREDIT CARD LENDING

To understand the competitive structure of

it is crucial
to understand the shift in
industry emphasis over the last
few decades from finance to
information technology.
the credit card industry,

advances in information
technology have improved
the ability of credit card issuers
to distinguish among their
customers and thus segment
their product offerings.

Specifically, I argue that the profitability of firms in the
industry—the growth and decline of their market shares,
the success of their new products, and their vulnerability
to competitors—depends much less on the cost of funds
or any measure of care or “prudence” in underwriting
than it does on the technological sophistication with
which the firms design and manage their interactions
with their customers. To explain this point, I start with a
brief summary of the business of credit card issuers and
how it has developed over time.

Most importantly, issuers now offer a wide variety of
products, which can be placed along a spectrum from
transactor-based to revolver-based. As Figure 1 shows,
the ratio of purchase volume to outstanding receivables
differs remarkably even among the largest issuers. Some
issuers, most notably American Express, focus primarily
on transactors; with a transaction volume almost six
times the size of its receivables, it stands apart from all of
the other substantial issuers. Issuers of that product try
to earn interchange fees that exceed the cost of funds,
transaction costs, and any chargeoffs. Thus, those issuers
attempt to maximize the number of cardholders that
use their cards frequently for high-value purchases. The
products directed to those customers are likely to include
substantial affinity rewards and low interest rates.6

1. The Proliferation and Specialization of Credit Card
Products
As recently as twenty years ago, the business of credit
card issuing was a relatively simple one, with a more or
less standard interest rate of 18 percent and three broad
classes of potential customers: transactors, revolvers, and
those too risky to receive cards.
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Figure 1: Turnover Rates of Major Credit Card Issuers
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Source: Author’s calculations from Nilson Report.
Figure shows ratio of expenditures on cards during 2010 to receivables at end of 2010.
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Figure 2: Late and Overlimit Fees (1990-2008)
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Source: Cards Profitability Survey.
Figure shows ratio of late and overlimit fees to annual expenditures on cards.

In contrast, a revolver-based product focuses primarily
on revenues from interest and late or overlimit fees.
Putting American Express to the side, most of the other
large issuers emphasize a revolver-based model; as
Figure One shows, Chase, Bank of America, Citibank,
Capitol One, and Discover all have purchase volumes
about twice their outstanding receivables. That product
is less likely to have an annual fee and much more likely
to have a high interest rate. The central task for the issuer
of that product is to identify and attract customers who
will carry substantial balances, without repaying them
in full each month, and without defaulting (at least
before they have paid on the balances for a period long
enough to amortize the card issuer’s investment in the
customer). That model also depends, at least in part, on
late and overlimit fees. 7
Figure 2 traces the development of that model. Several
points are salutary. First, it documents the doubling
of the rate of those fees during the 1990s, as issuers
swarmed to the model. After a peak lasting until about
2004, however, the level of those fees began to decline.
A number of possible explanations are apparent. The
first is simply that consumers began to avoid these fees
by altering their conduct to avoid late and overlimit
transactions; as the fees became more common,
consumers learned of their costs and used greater efforts
to ensure that they did not accidentally charge beyond
46

Vol. 7, No. 2, Autumn 2011

their credit limit or pay their bills late. To the extent late
and overlimit fees resulted from accidental errors, rather
than liquidity constraints, this would make sense. A
broader, and not entirely unrelated, explanation is that
more sophisticated contracting structures developed to
increase interest revenues unrelated to the interest rate –
double-cycle billing, minimum finance charges, and the
like. As sophisticated issuers introduced those product
attributes, the pressure to generate revenues from late
and overlimit fees diminished, and their share of industry
revenues similarly declined.8
One additional trend of importance, along a spectrum
distinct from the transactor/revolver distinction, is the
rise of affinity and rewards products. Because there is
a cognizable cost to acquire and maintain each credit
card account, all issuers focus on ensuring that those
to whom they issue their cards use them as frequently
as possible. Industry executives designing products
frequently emphasize their desire that their cards will
be “top of the wallet.” The more the cards are used, the
more profitable the issuer’s operations. Because issuers
cannot compete on acceptance (in the United States
there is, with the exception of Discover, little variation
in acceptance among the major brands), affinity and
rewards cards play a particular role in the competition
for “top of the wallet status.” Traditionally, specialized
monoline issuers like MBNA dominated that business,

but through acquisitions, that business has for the
most part fallen into the hands of Bank of America and
JPMorgan Chase.
The combination of those trends produces a mindboggling potential for variation in product design.
Driven both by consolidation (as the larger issuers
acquire the portfolios of smaller issuers) and by market
pressures, most of the large issuers now have large
suites of products, including dozens of distinct credit
card products, all targeting particular niches along the
spectrum from transactors to revolvers, and particular
pockets of affinity (specified sports teams, universities,
social causes, and the like). For example, as of the fall of
2011, Bank of America displayed 72 distinct credit card
products at its Web site. Although other issuers can’t
compete with that diversity, the number of distinct
products at other major issuers is still impressive: U.S.
Bank’s web site advertises 29 different cards, CitiBank’s
27, Chase’s 20, and Capitol One’s 14. Even once-stodgy
American Express advertises 22 different products (15 of
which are credit cards and 7 of which are charge cards).
time.

2. Proprietary Predictive Models
The complexity and heterogeneity of modern credit card
products presents numerous challenges to businesses
that attempt to issue them profitably. For one thing, the
issuance of cards involves a substantial expenditure—
the process of sending solicitations, responding to
applications, and issuing cards—that will produce no
revenues at all unless the cardholder in fact begins
to use the card for purchases. And if the cardholder
maintains an unpaid balance, the consequent lending is
rife with risks that are unusual for the typical bank lender.
Unlike the lender on a home or a car, the lender has no
collateral. The lender has no control over the uses to
which the money is put. The debt is to be repaid over an
extended period of time, on a payment schedule for the
most part selected by the customer.

Thus, a successful credit card lender must
have expertise at surveying the potential
customers available to it;
predicting which ones are likely to use the cards,
whether they are likely to default, and how long it is
likely to be before they default; and managing accounts

capably in light of those projections. There is a great
deal of room for increased (or decreased) profitability
based on the level of sophistication applied to those
activities.
The difficulties issuers faced in the early days of the
credit card industry arose directly from the primitive
information technology then available to the issuers
and networks. Thus, it was a bold development
in the early years of the 1970s when Visa for the
first time could introduce electronic processing to
clear transactions among the various credit card
companies—something that now is a simple and
routine matter.
For the most part today, what distinguishes those who
are successful and profitable from their competitors
is skill at collecting, manipulating, and analyzing
information. The historical example of Providian is
conspicuous. At one time, it was a major player in
the subprime market, but its inability to understand
the risks inherent in its portfolio led to unsustainably
high levels of chargeoffs, which eventually forced it to
withdraw from that sector.
Issuers do not simply guess what customers will do with
the cards that are offered or issued to them. Nor, like
mortgage lenders, do they rely on third-party scoring
systems (like Fair Isaacs) that are readily available to all
in the industry. Rather, at all points along the lifecycle of
each account (from the universe of potential customers
through the group of existing customers at any given
time), issuers access and gather immense databases,
which they analyze in an effort to understand the likely
patterns of use and risk associated with each customer
profile. The more information issuers can use in their
models, the better those models can predict future card
use and the risks associated with each individual.
The better models predict future use and chargeoff
risks, the better the issuer’s ability to acquire (and retain)
profitable customers and to avoid (or shed) unprofitable
customers. The benefits drop straight to the issuer’s
bottom line. Models that more precisely and accurately
predict the likelihood and timing of chargeoffs will
allow the issuer to design a more profitable mix of
product solicitations and to manage existing accounts
in ways that attract or repel customers that are less (or
more) likely to generate chargeoffs. Together, those
will allow the issuer to keep lower reserves against
future chargeoffs. Lower chargeoffs and lower reserve
requirements lead directly to increased profitability.
Vol. 7, No. 2, Autumn 2011
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Improving predictive models benefits issuers at several
stages of the life cycle of a particular customer. First,
the issuer with a better model of consumer behavior
will be able to do a better job of targeting solicitations
to the customers. The process of sending solicitations
is extremely expensive, largely because the response
rate has fallen significantly even as the number of
solicitations has increased: CitiBank alone sent more
than 350 million solicitations in the third quarter of
2011, expending about a quarter of a billion dollars.9
The goal of each solicitation is to get as high a response
rate as possible from the most desirable group of
customers.
Thus, a solicitation can fail either because too few
people respond, or because the group that responds is
a surprisingly unprofitable group of customers. Given
the amount of money at stake, it should be no surprise
that the issuers sending such a blizzard of solicitations
invest heavily in technology to predict and improve the
responses they receive.
Improved predictive models also benefit issuers when
they set the terms of the cards that are issued when
cardholders respond to the solicitation. As individual
cardholders respond to a single solicitation, issuers
allocate different terms (interest rates, grace periods,
credit limits) based on the issuers’ assessment of the
likely future behavior of the responding customers.
Again, issuers can err by issuing too few cards (and thus
losing desirable customers to other issuers) or by issuing
too many cards (and thus issuing cards that are underused or lead to chargeoffs).
Perhaps the most important use of these kinds of
predictive models involves the ongoing management
of existing cardholder accounts. Relying on those
models, issuers use predictions about future cardholder
behavior to make instantaneous and precisely targeted
decisions about such things as increases or decreases in
credit limits, alterations in interest rates, and responses
to overlimit transactions or late payments. For example,
sophisticated issuers customarily use predictive tools
widely for such purposes as updating credit limits,
issuing balance transfer offers, setting prices, and
identifying likely future chargeoffs.
In sum, although it is an exaggeration to say that
lending expertise is no longer important in the credit
card industry, it is just as true that lending expertise and
caution standing alone are not enough to compete
successfully.
48
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B) THE CCA AND CREDIT CARD LENDING

Against that backdrop, it is useful to consider the
CCA. For present purposes, the principal substantive
provisions of the CCA fall into two categories. The first
category includes prohibitions on conduct reasonably
characterized as sharp dealing, by which I mean
contractual attributes and business practices that are
substantially more costly to the customer than any
efficiency or cost saving they might produce for the
issuer. In this category, for example, I would include the
prohibition on double-cycle billing,10 the requirement
that cardholders opt in to over-the-limit fees,11 the rules
requiring prompt crediting of payments,12 and the strict
limits on “fee harvester” cards.13
None of those provisions should substantially affect
competition among the major players in the credit card
industry by which I mean, loosely speaking, the large
issuers identified in Figure 1, who increasingly control
the market for credit card lending. In some cases,
including fee harvesting, the provisions outlaw activity
in which none of those issuers ever engaged.14 In
others, they outlaw arguably fraudulent behavior that
was already within the control of federal regulators,
such as unreasonable limitations on crediting
payments.15 In still others, they outlaw contract terms
that major issuers had already stopped using before
Congress enacted the CCA, like the practice of doublecycle billing.16
Those provisions probably are beneficial, because they
outlaw conduct that serves no useful purpose. But they
will not individually or collectively have any important
affect on the way in which issuers design products and
compete against each other.
The limitations on interest-rate increases in § 101 of the
CCA (adding § 171 to the Truth in Lending Act17) stand
out as qualitatively different. Among other things, that
statute generally prohibited “retroactive” interest rate
increases: interest rate increases that apply to funds
already borrowed from the lender.
The only exception is for a variable interest rate
that changes because of an index, rather than the
borrower’s individual characteristics or because of a
failure of the borrower to make required minimum
payments on the card account. This requires a major
shift in business practices, amounting to a fundamental
recasting of the basics of credit card underwriting.

Even with the predictions of future behavior drawn
from their sophisticated modeling, credit card issuers
traditionally have relied on product attributes that let
them respond in real time to shifts in the perceived
riskiness of their customer base. This is at least in part
because so many of the adverse events that increase the
riskiness of a particular customer are random events that
have so little to do with an individual’s past history that
even the best modeling can do little to predict them.
Thus, credit card issuers traditionally have reserved in their
contracts the ability to increase interest rates on individual
customers at any time or from time to time, for almost any
reason that motivates the issuer to think this prudent.18
It always was common, of course, to increase interest
rates in response to a failure of the borrower to make
the required payments on the credit card account. But
many lenders used “universal default” provisions, under
which they increased interest rates on a credit card
whenever they learned (through credit bureaus and
the like) of a default by their customer on any other
account: so the credit card interest rate went up, even if
the cardholder was keeping that account current, solely
because of a default on an electric bill.
Even more aggressively, some lenders took the
opportunity of repricing interest rates before the
cardholder defaulted on any payment, solely because of
a shift in attributes that, in the judgment of the lender,
increased the borrower’s risk profile.19
This is related to the practice, central to the revolvingcredit business model, of issuing cards on the
expectation that cardholders will build balances on
them relatively quickly and then pay them off slowly,
over a long number of years.20 The balance-transfer
method of acquiring customers epitomizes this: instead
of waiting for your own customers to charge up their
balances, you acquire customers that have already built
up balances on the cards of other issuers, gambling
that if you do your underwriting properly they will
take so long to pay off the balances that you will profit
even after paying whatever enticement you offered to
acquire them.
The market-oriented premise of this regime is that if the
issuer increases the rate excessively, the cardholder can
avoid the excessive charges by repaying the credit card
lender. By hypothesis, the cardholder would simply shift
its outstanding balance to any other lender willing to
lend at a lower rate; if the cardholder is borrowing at

any given time from the lender offering the lowest rate,
then the cardholder has little about which to complain.
That market-oriented perspective overlooks a great
deal of the reality that confronts the borrower. Most
obviously, the borrower’s ability to repay the lender
is likely to be most limited at the moment the lender
raises interest rates: if interest rates are raised when the
borrower experiences financial distress, the borrower
likely will find it hard to repay its credit card lender out
of ready cash or to find a new lender willing to lend at a
modest rate.
At the same time, by increasing the interest rate on the
outstanding credit card debt, the lender increases the
borrower’s financial distress by increasing the borrower’s
monthly obligations.
Thus, whatever its premise, in practice the real-time
interest-rate adjustment is likely to complicate the
borrower’s efforts to respond to financial distress, if not
tip the borrower over the edge entirely.
Seen against that business model, the prohibition on
retroactive interest rate increases is a major challenge. If
credit card lenders cannot shift interest rates in response
to changes in the borrower’s risk profile as they occur,
the lender instead must set an interest rate before
advancing funds to the borrower in the first instance—a
rate which must be adequate to compensate for all
anticipated shifts in riskiness that can be foreseen as
likely to occur before the debt will be repaid.
This is particularly complicated for borrowers that are
likely to build up a substantial balance early in their
relationship and then carry that balance for many years
into the future, slowly making payments on it but not
completely paying off the balance.
For those customers, the interest rate established at the
beginning of the relationship, when the lender has little
or no experience of the borrower’s repayment behavior,
will be the interest rate that must stick with the account
for what well might be an extended time period. It is
easy to see that this increases by an order of magnitude
the difficulty of the underwriting and risk-modeling task
that faces the credit card lender. It is safe to say that only
the most sophisticated of credit card lenders will have
adjusted to that challenge without difficulty.
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C) CONCENTRATION IN THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY

The natural question to ask is why anybody should be
concerned that Congress has made the task of credit
card underwriting harder. After all, the avowed purpose
of the CCA was to rein in the industry, and making the
task harder should lower the profits of those lenders
and thus lower the absolute or relative amount of that
lending in the economy. If credit card lending imposes
a negative external cost on society, then anything that
lessens credit card lending is beneficial.21
The truth, I believe, is considerably more complex. The
central problem is the industrial organization of the
credit card industry, which is fissured not only along
the lines of differing strategies of credit card lending
as discussed in Part I, supra, but also into lending and
non-lending sectors. Thus, although there are several
thousand general-purpose credit card issuers, the
number of significant debt issuers is much smaller.
As of 2010, the share of receivables held by the top ten
issuers (those that appear in Figure 1) was about 87
percent; the top four issuers alone (JPMorgan Chase,
Bank of America, CitiBank, and American Express) held
60 percent.22
The heavy concentration of credit card lending in
such a small group of issuers is not a coincidence. The
profits from “ordinary” credit card issuance, reliant on
interchange fees, involve many of the typical attributes
of expertise broadly distributed throughout the banking
industry: building customer loyalty, attraction to the
bank’s brand, and the like.
Thus, it is much easier for “ordinary” banks to compete
in the business of having their customers use their
credit cards for ordinary day-to-day transactions. This
is especially true when the credit cards are issued as
one part of a broader relationship, and thus need not
generate significant profit on a standalone basis. It is
much harder, though, for the reasons discussed, supra
Part I, and infra Part II, to issue credit card debt profitably.
Thus, the rapidly increasing sophistication of that
business brought on by the use of information
technology in the last two decades has made it
increasingly hard for smaller issuers to compete, steadily
driving them from that business and driving lending
portfolios ineluctably into the hands of the largest and
most technologically sophisticated issuers.
50
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the dead weight
dropped on the industry by §
171 has a different meaning:
it is yet another challenge to
the “ordinary” banks trying to
compete against the few largest technologically
Seen through that lens,

sophisticated credit card lenders. For the largest banks,
§ 171 should pose a challenge, but not an insuperable
one, as they presumably have been able to modify
their products to predict future repayment behaviors
relatively well. For smaller banks, however, with less
cutting-edge modeling expertise, this should accelerate
their move out of the lending market.
To be sure, those banks could invest in the modeling
technology necessary to price their products as
effectively as the large banks, but for several reasons
this is likely to be quite difficult. The most obvious is
that because their portfolios are smaller, they will have
a smaller asset base over which to amortize the costs of
their investment.
This problem is exacerbated by the rapid segmentation
of products, infra Section I.A.1.
Where the portfolios of the larger issuers can be split
into dozens of separate pieces, each with separate
underwriting and pricing criteria, yet still large enough
for effective modeling, the much smaller portfolios of
the smaller issuers make it quite difficult for them to
compete in specific segments.
A small issuer with a portfolio a fraction the size of the
ones held by JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America will
find it much more difficult to obtain enough customers
in any particular segment to compete effectively against
the precisely targeted products of those issuers. They will
have many fewer customers in any particular segment,
and thus much less information on which to form
predictions about the likely use and repayment behavior
of those customers if they do issue a competitive card.
If they respond to the uncertainty by higher pricing,
then almost by definition their products will not be
competitive.
It is, then, difficult to see how the smaller issuers can
hope, in the longer run, to compete on card product
definition and management standing alone. They must,
if they are to remain in the market, compete on a “whole
relationship” basis.

II. THE DURBIN AMENDMENT
AND THE DEBIT CARD
INDUSTRY
A) THE ROLE OF DEBIT CARDS IN BANK ACCOUNT
RELATIONSHIPS

Although their use at the point of sale is functionally
similar to that of credit cards, the role of debit cards
in financial services is completely different. Credit
card markets are dominated by large national (and
multinational) banks that hold gigantic portfolios
unrelated to their deposit structures. Thus, the largest
portfolios are constructed, for the most part, of
customers that have no depositary relationship with the
issuer, and often no relationship beyond the card at all.23
The rise of securitized financing played a major role in
weakening the link to deposits, because it provided what
seemed to be a low-cost and reliable source of funding
that allowed banks like MBNA, Providian, and Capitol
One to issue credit card loans in sizes that far exceeded
the deposit base that was the traditional source of funds
for credit card lending. Even now, with Capitol One
the only remaining major credit card lender without a
nationally significant deposit base, large-scale funding
of credit card loans through securitized financing leaves
the tie between deposits and credit card lending thin at
best.24
The situation with debit cards is quite different. Debit
cards are almost universally issued by a bank with which
the cardholder has a deposit-account relationship.25
Thus, debit cards and their pricing are an integral part
of a larger relationship. This has several ramifications for
the industry’s structure. For one thing, because debit
card issuance loosely parallels deposit collection, the
debit card industry is much less concentrated than the
credit card industry. For example, the top four debit
card issuers (by purchase volume) control only 39
percent of the market; the top ten, less than half the
market.26
Second, revenues from debit cards interact much more
broadly with the account relationship; their “subsidy” is
not internal to the product as it is for credit cards. Thus,
debit card interchange fees essentially have funded
free or low-cost checking accounts. Generally speaking,
revenues from debit card interchange fees, in the range
of fifty cents per transaction since settlement of the Visa
and MasterCard antitrust litigation27 in the early years of

the century, have provided revenues that offset the
costs of checking account services, especially for
customers with relatively low average balances. Among
other things, this has facilitated broader penetration
of mainstream checking account services to low- and
middle-income populations.28
The price structure reflects the reality that debit cards,
like credit cards, are a two-sided product. Thus, the
manager of the relevant network must coordinate
prices and terms for two distinct groups of users,
managing those terms and prices to maximize the value
to be derived from use of the product.
For credit cards, relatively high interchange revenues
(charges imposed by the networks on the merchants)
traditionally have facilitated quite generous terms for
cardholders, including extensive rewards programs,
which have fostered rapidly growing card usage. The
parallel for debit cards has been interchange charges
on merchants at levels sufficiently high to provide
resources that facilitate broad provision of relatively
low-cost bank accounts as a benefit to the cardholder
side.29
Although merchants understandably have opposed
cost structures in which they bear the brunt of
expenses, the product borne from those cost structures
has been undeniably successful.
As Figure 3 illustrates, debit card usage (as a share of
consumer payment transactions) has increased from
about 1 percent in 1994 to more than 25 percent in
2009, surpassing both credit cards and checks. Much
of that growth has come at the expense of declining
check use. Because checks are a paper-based payment
system with high transaction costs, the shift to an
electronically cleared system like debit cards presents
a clear social benefit.30 To the extent debit card growth
also comes at the expense of credit card use, as seems
to be the case since 2007, there is a parallel social gain
to the extent that routine debit card use limits the
unreflective borrowing associated with routine credit
card use.31
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B) THE DURBIN AMENDMENT AND DEBIT CARD ISSUANCE

C) CONCENTRATION IN DEBIT CARD ISSUANCE

The Durbin Amendment to Dodd-Frank strikes at the
heart of that system, requiring a drop in debit card
interchange fees to a cost-justified level. Specifically
(as codified in the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)),32 the
Durbin Amendment requires the Federal Reserve to
define a cap on interchange fees that is “reasonable
and proportional to” the issuer’s costs.33 Also, in an
effort to bolster downward pressure on network-level
interchange pricing, the statute requires that each card
have “bugs” from at least two non-affiliated networks, so
that a merchant has two different ways to process each
transaction.34

As a matter of economic theory, the Durbin Amendment
is profoundly wrong-headed. It is premised on the
notion that lack of competition in the debit card
industry has led to an unnaturally elevated price that
banks collusively charge to merchants for the debit card
product.

To implement the statute, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, exercising authority delegated to it by
the Durbin Amendment, originally proposed a fee cap
of 12 cents per transaction, a stark drop from preexisting
market levels averaging about 50 cents.
In response to voluminous comments on its proposed
rule, the Federal Reserve ultimately adopted a final
rule35 that sets a cap of 21 cents plus .05 percent of
the transaction amount, amounting to approximately
24 cents per transaction.36 As compared to preexisting
market levels, this amounts to a revenue drop of about
50 percent.37
52
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But there is no reason to expect a priori that a network
in a fully competitive environment would set a price
on either side that bears any predictable relation to the
costs of providing services to that side.
Thus, the acknowledged fact that existing interchange
fees are, for many banks, higher than the costs of
processing debit card transactions proves nothing at all
about the efficiency of the market or the “correct” debit
interchange price. The relevant question is whether the
networks are setting prices that maximize growth of
their network. The rapid uptake in debit cards in recent
years (summarized, supra Figure 3) suggests that they
are.
To put it bluntly, economic theory suggests no reason
to think that shifting to a cost-justified level of fees for
debit card interchange will improve the efficiency of the
affected markets.

To be sure, the statute rejects that understanding of the
debit card market and proceeds on the supposition that
existing prices reflect improper price-fixing by the major
networks. Even on that basis, however, there is great
reason to expect that the statute will have a substantial
adverse effect on market structure.
On its face, the statute bears evidence of Congress’s
intention to protect small issuers. Specifically, cards
issued by small issuers (those with less than $10 billion
of assets) are exempted from the price-level restrictions
imposed by TILA § 920(a).38 For several reasons, however,
it is likely that the statute will disadvantage the smaller
institutions singled out for protection by the small-issuer
exemption.
The first and practical reason is that networks have
little or no incentive to establish separate, higher price
levels for their smallest and least influential issuers.
As discussed above, networks that control two-sided
products like debit cards thrive by coordinating the
prices and terms on the two sides of the network so as
to maximize the growth of the network.
Among other things, they must attract transactions to
their network and they can do that only by attracting
issuers that issue large volumes of cards. The basic
problem this creates is that networks that establish
special elevated pricing for small issuers will offend their
most important issuers, the large issuers on whose cards
the overwhelming majority of debit card transactions
occur.

Thus, the most likely response of large
networks is to adopt fee structures that
minimize the revenue advantages of
small issuers over large issuers.39

Accordingly, it appears that merchants could lawfully
refuse to accept small-issuer cards on any network
that allows small issuers to collect substantially greater
interchange fees than the Durbin Amendment caps for
large issuers.
The third reason that the Durbin Amendment is likely
to affect small issuers particularly harshly relates to the
cost structure of the industry. Before promulgating
Regulation II, the Federal Reserve collected data from
issuers on their cost structures.
The data show substantial economies of scale in the
costs of debit card processing. For the largest issuers,
average variable costs appear to be less than four cents
per debit card transaction; for those issuers, Regulation
II leaves approximately twenty cents per transaction to
subsidize other account services.
This is, to be sure, much less than what they had
before the Durbin Amendment, but it is a substantial
continuing revenue stream. For most small issuers,
by contrast, average variable costs appear to exceed
twenty-five cents per transaction.42
Thus, for those issuers, transactions processed at the
cap would be processed at a loss; not only would this
eliminate the subsidy of other services entirely, it would
require a flow of funds from other sources to debit-card
processing. For those institutions, then, maintaining
revenues substantially above the Regulation II cap is
not only attractive, it is crucial to the existing business
model. Because continuation of those revenue levels is
unlikely, small issuers face daunting challenges in the
years to come.

III. ROOTING OUT
COMPETITION

The second is the ability of the merchant to steer
customers away from high-cost cards. For one thing,
the Durbin Amendment allows merchants to control
routing, to select whatever network they prefer from the
networks on a card, and small issuers are not exempt
from that provision.40

So what does this mean? Let us suppose I am correct in
my conjecture that the CCA and the Durbin Amendment
will exacerbate the market push driving relatively small
banks from the payment card industry. What adverse
effects can we attribute to this? The first and obvious
one is lessening competition.

Furthermore, although the Durbin Amendment does
prohibit merchants from discriminating on the basis
of an issuer’s identity,41 it does not prohibit them from
discriminating on the basis of price.

Although it is easy to suggest that competition between
Visa and MasterCard has rarely been aggressive,
competition at the bank level traditionally has been
vigorous.
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For credit card issuance, thousands of issuers produce
a blizzard of television advertisements and billions of
annual solicitations sent by mail. For the basic business
of consumer banking, the medium is different—the
local billboard supplementing nationwide television
advertising campaigns—but the market for consumer
banking accounts traditionally has been relatively
robust.43
Yet as the number of effective players falls ever lower,

the point is coming (if it is not
already here) when there are
few issuers competing for the
business of any particular
consumer.
This is particularly salient in the credit card sector given
the trend toward segmentation, which allows larger
issuers to provide products that can compete nationally
for smaller and smaller groups of precisely defined
customers.
The consequences of such a decline of competition,
at least under classic economic theory, are simple: an
increase in price and a fall in supply. It is safe to assume
that neither Congress nor the federal competition
regulators (the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission) would applaud a conspicuous
decline in competition in such an important industry.
Indeed, the Durbin Amendment was enacted on the
stated premise that small issuers would be protected.
For several reasons, however, I doubt this simplistic take
on the competitive impact of these statutes is adequate.
On the one hand, it is easy to argue after the recent
economic meltdown that unbridled competition by
financial institutions is itself socially harmful. What we
have seen in the last decade is the specter of financial
institutions substantially unconstrained by regulators,
driven by cutthroat competition into lending that was so
plainly imprudent as to drive the world financial system
to the brink of collapse.
Commentators can speculate and argue about what
particular piece of the system led to such an exuberance
of irrationally imprudent lending. Was it the existence
of deposit insurance and related regulatory institutions
that left banks too little concerned about the effects of
imprudent lending?44
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Was it the markets that allowed (or even encouraged)
banks to make loans based on insupportable valuations
by making it so easy for them to transfer the risks of
nonpayment to others?45
Was it the relative asymmetry of institutions that made
it easy to withdraw home equity during times of rising
prices but left no similar exit strategy for times of
falling prices?46 Or was it the failure of financial analysts
to understand the nature of the risks created by the
financial instruments into which these loans were
packaged?47
Whatever the reason for the problem was, it is clear that
unbridled competition exacerbated the problems into
which they have driven our economy. Accordingly, we
should acknowledge at least one beneficial side effect
to reforms that undermine vigorous competition in
financial markets: they lessen the risks we all face from
destructive competition in those markets.
On the other hand, a look at the particular actors
affected here tells a less sanguine story of the aggregate
effects of these statutes. In both cases, they accelerate
shifts away from an older, more relational style of
financial services toward a more information- and
product-centered model based in technocratic norms.
Thus, if I am right in thinking that the CCA is effectively
driving the smaller, more relational issuers from the
lending sector of the credit-card industry, the market
response will not be limited to a decline in competition
about price. It also includes a broader eradication of a
model of banking in which the bank sees a credit card as
one of a suite of products issued to a particular customer,
out of which the bank needs to profit in aggregate.
Because this model involves less of the highly aggressive
lending characteristic of the largest, most informationintensive lending experts, it probably has less of the
adverse social costs that go with that lending. If the only
issuers with competitive significance are the very largest
and most technologically focused lenders, we should be
concerned about the potential for a shift to

a market in which all credit
card lending is conducted at
the harsh edge of riskiness that
maximizes the adverse social
cost of the product.

The Durbin Amendment’s effects are likely parallel. By
putting inordinate pressure on the cost structures of
community banks and credit unions,

the statute is likely to accelerate
the shift toward the large
money-center institutions
and away from the smaller, more fragmented localized
financial institutions. This seems particularly perverse,
given the role money-center institutions played in
the recent crisis and given the unique role the smaller
institutions play in funneling capital to small businesses
and employers remote from national financial centers.
It would be easy to view these statutes through a simple
public-choice model as yet two more examples of
the continuing political power of the largest financial
institutions.48 To me, however, it makes more sense to
emphasize the particular perversity that the CCA and
the Durbin Amendment share: a failure to recognize
the links between product design and market structure.
The central flaw in the CCA is its failure to recognize the
relation between interest-rate flexibility and the ability of
smaller banks to manage credit card lending effectively.

The central weakness of the Durbin
Amendment is its misunderstanding of
the relation between interchange fee
levels and the cost structure of small
institutions.
Given Congress’s stated intention to protect small
institutions in Durbin, I find it more accurate to view
the statutes as example of ineptitude – poor craft in
policymaking – than venality in intentionally favoring
the interests of the largest institutions. I leave it to the
reader to judge which perspective bodes better for the
future of financial regulation.
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